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1.1 Aim and Contents of Paper
The aim of this paper is to examine democracy and oligarchy in
the independent trade unions in Transvaal and the Western
Province General Workers Union in the 1978s. The unions
considered in the Transvaal comprise the Federation of South
African Trade Unions <F0SATU> and the Consultative Committee of
Black Trade Unions. The Consultative unions consisted of the
Commercial Catering and Allied Workers7 Union CCCAWUSA) and a
large proportion of the present Council of Unions of South Africa
(CUSA). The period this paper covers commences from the
foundation of the unions in the early 1970s up to the second half
of 1979 for the Transvaal unions and up to the end of 1988 for
the Western Province General Workers' Union.
The paper is divided into two major sections. The first section
deals with theories of democracy and oligarchy in trade unions
and starts off by considering Michels' iron law of oligarchy.
His iron law is evaluated in the light of two centuries of
experience in the British trade unions as analysed mainly by the
Webbs, Clegg and Hyman. After deriving a theory of democracy
and oligarchy in trade unions based on the historical material,
the paper moves on to the second section which examines democracy
and oligarchy in the independent trade unions in the 1970s. The
stage the unions reached at the end of the period is evaluated
and some conclusions are finally drawn.
However, before commencing on theories of trade union democracy
and oligarchy it is necessary to clarify some key concepts first
and consider the role of democracy in trade unions. In order to
keep this paper within the required length this will be done very
briefly. This means that I shall often simply state my own
position on a number of issues without drawing on authorities to
support me.
1.2 Trade Union Democracy
Trade unions are organisations of wage-earners that exist
primarily to defend and advance their members" rights at the
workplace. Not all wage-earners are working class, but since
this is the case for the unions under consideration in this
paper, it will be assumed throughout this paper that trade union
members are proletarian workers.
In order to ach i eve the i r basic object i ve of defendi ng and
advancing workers rights at the workplace, trade unions have
three requirements: power to force concessions from management in
negotiations, democracy to ensure that they reflect the interests
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o-f the workers, and dynami sm to sustai n worker support and grow
stronger. The dynamism inherent in trade unions means that they
have come to be const dered as a movement as we II. Flanders has
captured the requi remen ts o-f trade un i ons as xa mixture o-f
movement and organisation":
One problem wh i ch has always confronted trade un i ons is
how to convert" temporary movement into permanent
organization... Trade unions need organization for
the i r power and movement for their vitality, but they
need both power and vitality to advance their social
purpose. (1)
The need for 'power and vitality' on the part of trade un i ons
indicate that democracy is not the only requirement of unions.
There are also times when democracy is in conflict with the need
for power or movement on the part of unions. It is therefore
important not to consider democracy as the only objective of
trade unions, but only as one of three means towards the end of
advancing workers' rights.
Many external and internal pressures exist to deflect trade
unions from their objective of advancing workers" rights.<2> It
is therefore necessary for unions to ensure that they represent
their worker members' interests. The best way of ensuring it is
to have internal democracy. But what is trade union democracy?
A number of approaches have been adopted towards trade un i on
democracy. <3> The approach to trade un i on democracy that i s
adopted in this paper is as follows. Trade union democracy
rests on the ultimate control of workers of their organisation.
This requires that they play a part in decision-making on policy
and strategic matters affecting the union, and that un i on
representatives and officials remain accountable to the rank and
file members. The criteria specified in the definition will be
used to assess whether unions are democratic or not. They will
however have to be applied judiciously since the other needs of
trade unions, namely power and dynamism, could at times have
conflicted with trade un i on democracy and necessi tated
compromise actions.
2. Theory of Democracy and Oligarchy in Trade Unions
2-1 Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy
One of the best known theories on trade union democracy and
oligarchy is that of Michels that was first published in 1911.
<4) In it he is particularly concerned with the problems of
attai ni ng democracy in soc i ali st organ i sat i ons of the work i ng
class. He examines the trends in both political parties and
trade unions and comes up with the M a w ' that 'democracy leads to
oligarchy, and necessarily contains an oligarchic nucleus'. <5>
By oligarchy in an organisation is meant control thereof by a few
officials in the top hierarchy of that organ i sat i on.
Michels' argument is that democracy is a self-defeating goal.
This is the case because ^democracy is inconceivable without
organisation' <6) and that organisation is vital -for the
political struggle of the working class. <7> However, there is
an inevitable tendency towards oligarchy in every organisation,
no matter how hard it strives to be democrat i c . There-fore
democracy is an unattainable goal for all organisations in the
1abour m o v e m e n t .
M n the early days of the labour movement', while it is in its
'infancy' (8) and is still very small, M i c h e l s maintains that its
members attempt to practice a ^pure democracy' wh i ch enables them
all to participate in its organisations. However, as
organisations grow in size they become more complex and start
requiring leaders with special expertise to run them. (?) In
order to meet these requirements the labour movement starts
training their own leadership and establishing educational
institutions such as Ruskin College in Oxford for that p u r p o s e .
<18>
The increased complexity of the organisations, according to
M i c h e l s , places a full knowledge of their administrative and
other requi rements beyond the capacity of the worker m e m b e r s .
A division of labour therefore becomes necessary and suitably
qualified leaders have to take over the running of the
organisation. A s this happens, the rank and file lose control
of their organisation.
Nominally, and according to the letter of the rules, all
the acts of the leaders are subject to the ever vigilant
criticims of the rank and file. In theory the leader is
merely an employee bound by the instructions he
r e c e i v e s . . . But in actual fact, as the organisation
i ncreases in size, this control becomes purely
fictitious. The members have to give up the idea of
themselves conducting or even supervising the whole
administration, and are compelled to hand these tasks
over to... salaried officials. The rank and file must
content themselves with summary reports, and with the
appoi ntment of occasional special commi ttees of
inquiry... It is obvi ous that democrat ic control thus
undergoes a progressive diminution, and is ultimately
reduced to an infitesimal minimum. <11)
What is m o r e , M i c h e l s m a i n t a i n s that, in working class
organisations, as in the state, officials need to remai n in
office for a considerable time in order to acquire the necessary
expertise to do the work efficiently and to develop a sense of
loyalty and responsibility. <12) M i c h e l s thus contends that
democratic organisations become oligarchic due to a division of
labour.
Every democratic organisation rests, by its very nature,
upon a division of Iabour. But wherever di v i si on of
1abour prevails, there is necessarily specialisation,
and the specialists become indispensable. (13)
There are also other factors that serve to rein-force the tendency
towards ol igarchy in soc i a I ist working class organi sat ions,
according to Michels. The leaders of the organisations, whether
of ^proletarian' or of 'bourgeois' origin, tenaciously cling to
office once they have acquired it.
Firstly there is the allure of power. Once it has been acqu i red,
the leaders are not only unwilling to relinquish it, but
endeavour to extend it. <14) Secondly, leaders of proletarian
origin become attached to their positions because of the
improvement in their living standard wh i ch wou1d make i t
'altogether impossi ble for them to return to their old way of
1 ife' . <15>
Leaders who are ''refugees from the bourgeoisie' are also unable
or unwilling to relinquish their posts. This is either because
they have 'crossed the Rubicon' and have become 'enchained by
their own past', or because they have become 'estranged from
the i r or i gi nal professi on'. Wh i1e thi s wi11 not be a problem
for 1awyers because the political struggle and 1 aw have many
points of contact, sit is very different with men of science'
because they 'find that their scientific faculties undergo a slow
but progressi ve atrophy' and 'they are dead for their
di sc i pI i ne'.<16)
The last reinforcing tendency of oligarcy to mention in this
exposition of Michels, is the autocratic tendencies of leaders
wh ich, aceording to him, is more pronounced amongst trade unions
Ieaders than in politicians. (17) liichels maintains that the
executive committees of the trade union federations 'have
endeavoured to usurp the exclusive right to decide on behalf of
the rank and file the rhythm of the movement for better wages',
(18) and consequently on whether a strike is Justified and
whether to subsidise it or not. Thereby
the leaders have openly converted themselves into an
oligarchy, leaving the masses who provide the funds no
more than the duty of accepting the-decisions of that
oli garchy. <1?)
Michels' argument can thus be briefly summarised by his famous
maxim, 'who says organisation, says oligarchy'. (26)
Gouidner's Iron Law o-f Democracy
Numerous criticisms have been made of Michels. Richard Hyman
has pointed out that Michels has not given adequate attention to
countervailing tendencies in trade unions. <21) Gouldner went
as far as postulating a countervailing iron law of democracy:
Even as Michels h imse1f saw, if ol i garch i cal waves
repeatedly wash away the br i dges of democracy, this
eternal recurrence can happen only because men dogged1y
rebu i Id them after each i nundat ion. Michels chose to
dwell on only one aspect of this process, neglecting to
consider this other side. There cannot be an iron I aw
of oligarchy, however, unless there is an iron law of
democracy. (22)
The theories on democracy and oligarchy presented by Michels and
Gou1dner are both one-si ded. The Webbs offered a more balanced
view in their consideration of British trade unions in the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Their findings are
therefore considered next.
2,3 Early British Trade Union Democracy and Oligarchy-
Participatory Democracy and its Oligarchic Consequence
In the i r ace I aimed account of Br i t i sh trade un i on h i story f i rst
published in 1897 the Webbs demonstrated that the trade unions
went through different stages of development. In certain stages
democracy was in the ascendency while oligarchy and
central isation were paramount in other stages. ' The
circumstances and forces that determined which of these
tendencies dominated were closely linked with their histories.
The first stage was one the Webbs termed "primitive democracy'
and was a pure form of part i c i patory democracy. In the "local
trade clubs' of the eighteenth century the members strove to
conduct all the business at the general meeti ngs and were imbued
with the principle that xwhat concerns all should be decided by
all'. <23>
However, when the local unions started federating into national
unions between 1824 and 1840, it became necessary to depart from
their practice of participatory democracy. They dropped the
custom of rotating the officials as it became necessary for the
national unions to elect full-t ime secretaries. They still tried
to continue vesting supreme authority in the members by means of
the Referendum. <24)
These constitutional arrangements were however a recipe for
oligarchy. The appointment of a full-time general secretary
soon turned him into a powerful official by virtue of the
expertise he developed.
Spending all day at office work, he soon acquired a
professional expertness quite out of the reach of his
fellow-members at the bench or the forge... The work
could no longer be efficiently performed by an ordi nary
artisan, and some preliminary office training became
almost indispensable. (25)
In order to try and restrict the growing power of the full-time
salaried officials the unions resorted to laying down strict
rules in their consitutions and the amendment of these rules by
banch delegates who were granted no discretion and merely had to
convey the votes of their branches "mechanically'. (26) Over
t ime the meetings of delegates were replaced by the Referendum,
but none of these measures proved to be successful. The
keferendum however had the opposite effect of what was intended:
instead of the members retaining a real say in the affairs of the
union, control was centralised and enabled the development of
oligarchic rule by the officials and executive. This happened
because
the right of putting questions to the vote came
practically to be confined to the executive... Any
change which the executive desired could be stated in
the most p1ausi ble terms and supported by convine ing
arguements, wh i ch almost invariably secured its adopt i on
by a large majority. <27>
Thus, after about a century of organisational experience, the
ol i garch ic tendency was domi nant in the Br i t i sh trade un i on
movement towards the 1ast decade of the nineteenth century.
This, the Webbs maintained, was because of the attempt to retain
participatory democracry in the national organ i sat ions. (28>
But Nafter a whole century ot evneriment' trade un i on
constitutions were undergo ing a 'silent revolution" and trade
unions with a new form of democracy emerged after 1889. <29>
The form was representative democracy which, in the Webbs
op i n i on, was successful in solving
the fundamental problem of democracy, the combination of
administrative efficiency and popular control. <38)
Representative Democracy as a Countervailing Tendency
The two unions that best embodi ed the principle of representative
democracy at the t ime the Webbs conducted their research, were
the Coalminers and Cotton Operatives although other unions had
al so foil owed suit. At that stage the member sh ip of the-
Coalminers union was 200 060. <31) The central feature of the
system of representative democracy was the elect i on of an
assembly of representatives as the supreme body in the un i on.
Not only was the representative assembly the supreme policy-
making body of the union, but it also-appotnted an executive
committee which governed the union between conferences of the
assembl i es. C32)
The un i ons wi th representat i ve democracy had undergone
considerable evolution from the early forms of ^primitive
democracy . No prov i si on was made for the Referendum and the
sRotation of Office' was dropped. Of particular significance
was the fact that the unions found it necessary to completely
abandon the use of delegates and to replace them with
representatives. <33> The distinction between a delegate and a
representative was that, although both had to put forward the
mind of their constituency, the representative, unlike the
delegate, was Nnot a mechanical vehicle of votes on particular
subjects'. <34) According to the Webbs, the trade unions had
gradual 1 y come to realise the need for representatives as a
method of restor ing a balance between democracy and efficiency
in their organisations. The reasons for that as well as the way
in which the unions incorporated representatives into their
s t r u c t u r e s , were well explained by the W e b b s . Their exposition
is worth quoting at some length.
The ordinary Trade Unionist has but little facility in
expressing his d e s i r e s . . . But -for this particular task
the professional administrator is no m o r e competent than
the ordinary man, though for a different reason. The
very apartness of his life from that of the average
workman deprives him of close acquaintance with the
actual grievances of the m a s s of the p e o p l e . . . To act as
an interpreter between the people and their servants is,
therefore, the first function of the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e .
(35)
But this is only half of his duty. To him is entrusted
also the difficult and delicate task of controlling the
professional e x p e r t s . . . (36) In all these respects the
manual workers stand at a grave d i s a d v a n t a g e - . . Before
he can place himself on a level with the trained
official whom he has to control.he must devote his whole
time and thought to his new duties, and must therefore
give up his old trade. T h i s u n f o r t u n a t e l y tends to
alter his manner of life, his habit of m i n d , and usually
also his intellectual atmosphere to such an extent that
he gradually loses that vivid appreciation of the
feelings of the man at the bench or the f o r g e , which it
is his function to e x p r e s s . . . Directly the working-man
representative becomes becomes properly equipped for
one-half of his d u t i e s , he ceases to be specially
q u a l i f i e d for the o t h e r . If he r e m a i n s essentially a
manual worker, he fails to cope with the brain-working
o f f i c i a l s ; if he takes on the character of the brain-
w o r k e r , he is apt to get out of touch with the
constituents whose desires he has to interpret... (37)
In the par I i aments {conferences of representative
assemblies - JM> of the C o t t o n - s p i n n e r s and Coalminers
we find habitually two classes of m e m b e r s , salaried
o f f i c i a l s of the several d i s t r i c t s , and representative
w a g e - e a r n e r s still w o r k i n g at the mule or in the m i n e .
It would almost seem as if these modern o r g a n i s a t i o n s
had consciously recognised the impossibility of
combining in any . individual representative both of the
requirements that we have specified. A s it is, the
presence in their assemblies of a large proportion of
men w h o are still following their trade imports into
their deliberations the full flavor of w o r k i n g - c l a s s
sentiment. And the association...of the salaried
o f f i c e r s from each county, secures that combination of
knowledge, ability and practical experience in
administration, which is... absolutely indispensible for
the exercise of control over the professional e x p e r t s .
<38)
The u n i o n s thus made provision for representation of mental and
manual labourers on their assemblies and executive committees.
The executive of the Cotton Operatives, for instance, existed of
three office bearers as well as thirteen additional m e m b e r s ,
seven of whom had to be working spinners while the remaining six
were permanent officials. <3?> This had the effect of restoring
some popular control in the unions. Although the officials
still tended to dominate at the assembly conferences the worker
representatives frequently intervened vwi th effect' in the
procedures. <4Q>
Thus contrary to Michels, the Webbs perceived a countervai1 ing
democratic tendency within the trade union movement. Oligarchic
rule did not establish itself permanent 1y in the un ions, but w a s
challenged by worker representatives who endeavoured to restore
popular control to the unions,
it is however not clear from the Webbs exposition how worker
representatives, who spent a full working day at the bench or the
mule, were to acquire the time, energy, skill and necessary
resources to become an effective counterweight to the full-time
officials. Even though they made reference to the professional
representative' who was 'to balance the professional civil
servant' < 4 1 ) , they did not clarify how a full-time worker was to
acquire this status and ability. If they meant that the worker
was to Ieave his empIoyment in order to become a professi onal
representative, he would soon be indistinguishable from union
officials for reasons the Webbs themselves explained with such
clarity. This unresolved problem eventually resulted in the
reassertion of oligarchy in the British unions.
2.4 Trends in British Trade Unions in the Twentieth Century-
Oligarchy Re-asserts Itself
The Webbs completed the first draft of their British trade un i on
history in 1897 shortly after the rise of the 'new unionism' that
commenced in 1889. The 'new union ism''which entailed the first
wave of mass organisation of semi-skilled and unskilled workers
has been characterised as 'popular bossdoms'. <42) These unions
were 1 arge I y organ ised 'fpoin above' by existing 1 eaders and
enabled an ol igarchic tendency to become dominant again. <43)
From the nineteen thirties to fifties the British unions were
undeniably oligarchic in character. <44)
Most of the union executives, and at I of the union conferences,
regional and district committees were composed mainly or entirely
of lay members, i.e. members of the unions who were not full -
time officers or staff employees. Instead of representatives
from the workplace being elected to these posts, as the Webbs had
found and fondly hoped would continue, branch officers eventually
took over most of the posts. These branch officers undertook
'many tedious hours of paperwork' as well as union administration
and had no contact with the workplace. They bolstered the
strength of the full-time officials by providing 'solid support'
for their policies. (45)
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T h e d o m i n a n c e of union o f f i c i a l s and branch o f f i c e r s in the
u n i o n s c o u l d happen because *there w e r e no powerful t r a d i t i o n s of
of rank and file autonomy from b e l o w ' . <46) T h i s s i t u a t i o n w a s
to change d r a s t i c a l l y after the f i f t i e s in B r i t a i n .
The Assertion of Workplace Bargaining:
Trade Union Democracy Rises from the Ranks
In the same year that the Webbs completed their first history of
British trade unionism, a major industrial dispute took place in
the engineering industry that resulted in va widening of the
scope for shop steward action'. The result was that shop
stewards became workplace negotiators in addition to their
traditional task of guarding craft rules. <47)
There was a short-1i ved upsurge i n the shop stewards movement
during the First Wor1d War, but the economi c depression in the
interwar years caused workshop organisation to fall back. (48)
It was not until the 1950s and 1960s that shop stewards came to
the fore in industrial relations by shifting the emphasis to
workplace bargaining. The impulsion to this was provided by the
r i se in rank-and-f iIe strength and mi 1 i tancy generated by the
establ i shment of near full emp1oyment and frustration with
managerial and trade union practices and policies.
This "great upsurge of union activity' <49>
constituted, in the words of Flanders, "*a challenge from below'.
Goldthorpe characterised the change
in post-war Britain as an increase in ^the economic and
organisational strength of the workers on the shopfloor - in
consequence of which, the degree of effective control that can be
exerc i sed over them by e i ther managements or un i ons has been
significantly diminished'. (56)
In opposition to many Iiberal-p1uralist commentators who were
concerned about the ''challenge from bel ow' Ri chard Hyman , wr i t i ng
in 1975, enthusiastically perceived it as
the reassertion, far beyond their original craft
context, of prior traditions of autonomous worker
control. (51)
Shop stewards played a central part in the upsurge of workplace
bargaining in post-war Britain. Their rote was no longer one of
protecting a craft, but negotiating directly with management on
the shopfloor over wages and a wide range of working conditions.
A survey conducted in 1973 established that, besides wages, shop
stewards negotiated most frequently with management over general
condi t i ons in the workp1 ace i ncludi ng safety and health ,
di smi ssals and other disciplinary actions, overtime, the
introduction of new machinery or jobs, and transfers from one job
to another. <52>
The upsurge in autonomous workplace bargaining under the
leadership of shop stewards made its impact felt on trade union
organisation as well. The most significant change was the
incorporation of shop stewards into the union structures. This
resulted not only from the unions' desire to restore the control
ouer industrial relations they had lost by the 1960s, but also
from the power shopfIoor representatives had acquired in the
workplace. By impelling themselves onto the various bodies of
the un i ons, shop stewards did much to restore democrat i c
practices in the unions once agai n.
The Cycle Continues: Oligarchy on the Shopf1oor
But even at the grass-roots level of workplace organisation, an
oi i garchi c tendency started to assert i tself in the 1970s.
Wr i t ing in 1979, Hyman cast doubt on whether shop f1oor
representation was truly democrat i c:
A central feature of the past ten years has been the
consol i dat i on of a h i erarchy wi th i n shop steward
organisation... Workplace negotiation has become a far
more centralised process... The introduction and
operation of centralised bargaining arrangements has
been the responsibility of a new layer of full-time
convenors and shop stewards... The small cadre of full-
time or almost full-time stewards within a committee
often possess the authority and the informational and
organisational resources to ensure that their own
recommendat ions will be accepted as policy by the
stewards' body. C53)
Enough exposi t i on on the h i story of trade un i on democracy and
oligarchy has been presented to put forward a theory. The
experiences of the British trade unions over two centuries deny
Michels' iron law of oligarchy, but rather confirm that
tendencies towards democracy and oligarchy are both present in
trade unions. The tendency towards democracy arises from the
members' conviction that their trade unions have to represent
their interests and aspirations. To this end they desire to
have a say over union policy as well as hold officials and
representatives accountable to them. The say over union policy
and accountability of officials have been remote at times, but
remai ned the driving forces of democracy in the un i ons.
Democracy was thus usually impelled Into the unions by the
workers.
On the other hand the tendency towards oligarchy in trade unions
ar i ses from thei r need for 1eadersh ip and efficient
administration and co-ordination in the organisation. The
tendency is inextricably linked with the establishment of full-
time officials in a mass worker organisation where the rank and
file are employed in wage-labour that demands much of their time
and energy.
The relat i onsh i p between the tendencies towards democracy and
oligarchy in trade unions unfolds in a historical context.
Neither, democracy nor oligarchy establishes a permanent or
dec i si ve hegemony although the one or the other can domi nate for
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a considerable time. The forces that determine the dominance of
ol i garch i c or democrat ic tendencies may be either internal or
external to the unions.
Informed with this theory, it is now appropriate to consider the
democracy and oli garchy i n some of the independent trade unions
dur i ng the 1970s.
3.Democracy and Oligarchy in the Independent Trade Unions
3.1 Oligarchy and the Development of Democracy
Initial 01igarchy
The independent trade unions under consideration in this paper
all owed their existence to organisations other than trade unions
that were started in the early 1970s and were oligarchic in
character in so far as their relationship with African workers
was concerned. The General Workers'' Union <GWU> commenced as
the Western Province Workers' Advice Bureau (WPWAB), while FOSATU
in Transvaal had its roots in the Industrial Aid Society <IAS>
and the unions of the Consul tat i ve Commi ttee of Black Trade
Unions owed theirs mainly to the Urban Training Project <UTP).
There were two reasons why this was the case. In the first
place these organisations were founded during the ^survival era"
<54) when there was a great need for caution in the wake of state
repression of SACTU in the 1960s and continued state hostility
towards African trade unions. There was also a fear prevalent
among many Afr i can workers that belonging to trade un i ons cou1d
Iead to state harassment. The founders therefore deliberately
started organisations that were deemed to be safer than trade
un i ons.
Secondly the i n i t i at i ve for the format i on of these organ i sat i ons
came from small groups of intellectuals and experienced trade
unionists. <55> In the absence of any pre-existing mass
African worker organisations other than the TUCSA African unions,
they had to set up small organisations with themselves in control
as leaders, but with the intention of organising a broad mass of
workers i nto democrat i c organ isations. They all initially
created structures that either incorporated African workers or
related to them in an oligarchic manner in that the leadership
was self-appointed, unrepresentative of the workers as well as
unaccountable to them.
Creating Democratic Structures
Therefore the first challenge that faced all the organisations in
their quest for democratisation was to create structures and
organisations that were in fact democratic. The task was by no
means an easy one and took many years to achieve. Each of the
organisations also set about the process in a different way and
it is therefore necessary to consider each in turn.
1 1
Western Province Workers Advice Bureau
The Advice Bureau was founded in March 1973 by members o-f the
Un i vers i ty of Cape Town Wages Commi ss i on in conjunction with
NUSAS officials and former SACTU trade unionists. Although the
constitution made allowance for the election of an Executive
Commi ttee elected annually at the AGM, real control of the
organisation was in the hands of a small group of White
intellectuals drawn from the university and legal professi on
which became known as the Workers Advisory Project. <WAP> The
Advice Bureau's African secretary, a former trade unionist, also
formed part of this strategic planning group. In order to
prov i de the Adv ice Bureau with respectability in the eyes of
donors and a protective umbrella against the state, a Board of
Trustees was also set up. Its membership was determined by WAP
and composed mainly of WAP members as well as registered trade
unionists who were considered to be sympathetic.
Constitutionally, the Board of Trustees controlled appointments,
finances and decisions taken by the Executive Committee.
The Advice bureau placed an emphasis on workplace organisation
and adopted the strategy of setting up registered works
commi ttees. The number of organ i sed works commi ttees increased
rapidly and after almost two years of existence the intellectuals
in WAP felt that the time had come to transform the Advice Bureau
into a democratic organisation. The need for the transformation
arose out of the organisational developments in the Advice
bureau. Act i ve organ i sat i on at the workp1 ace was tak i ng pi ace
at a number of factories and finding expression through works
commi ttees. The Executive Commi ttee, wh i ch was elected at an
AGM and chaired by a rather conservative townsh i p Ieader, was
unrepresentative of the works commi ttees and out of touch with
i ssues at most factor i es.
After extensive discussions in WAP it was decided that a Workers'
Council should be established. It would consist of factory
committees elected by the workers at each factory and control of
the whole organisation as well as intellectuals in the movement
would be vested in the hands of the Workers' Council. The
achievement of this objective proved to be considerably more
difficult than was envisaged by the intellectuals. The first
Works Council which was established in April 1975 was stillborn
because it was premature. The workers in the Advice Bureau
lacked the expertise and organ isational experience to take
command of the Council and it simply failed to come to life.
It was only on the third attempt after two more years of
endeavour that success was achieved. By that stage it was
dec i ded to set up a Control ling Commi ttee compr i si ng two
representatives from each factory in the Advice Bureau and to
abolish the Executive Committee.
The Controlling Committee finally came into existence and started
functioning in the first half of 1977. The functions of the
Commi ttee were to control the organ i sat i on. All policy
dec i si ons were to be taken by the Commi ttee and organ isers as
well as the White intellectuals in the movement were to be
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appointed by the Committee and be accountable to it. It thus
took the Advice Bureau four years from the time of its foundation
to transform its own structure into that of a democratic worker
organisation. The following year it changed its name to the
Western Province General Workers' Union and in 1981 to simply the
General Workers' Unron which reflected the fact that it had
become a national union organising stevedores in the other major
harbour cities.
IAS
Similar to the Advice Bureau, the IAS in Johannesburg was also
founded by Wages Commission students and former NUSAS officials
in co-operation with former SACTU trade unionists. Its members
were also committed to the establishment of a democratic workers'
organisation, but the organisation went through considerable
turmoil in the process of transforming itself. The IAS was
founded in December 1973 and was initially headed by a Steering
Committee. It commenced organising African workers as well as
embarking on three projects including worker education. Due to
a lack of organisational progress after more than a year of
operation and anomalies in the organisation, the IAS restructured
itself in March 1975. An Executive Committee was put in control
of the IAS. It was a self-elected Committee and consisted
predominantly of White university-trained intellectuals, but also
included a couple of influential African 1eaders. It was
decided in principle that the Executive Committee would not have
worker representatives serving on it as it was explicitly
acknowledged that the Committee was not a representative body.
It was also dec i ded that worker representat ives would be elected
onto a separate executive committee of a worker organisation that
the IAS wouId found and that powers wouId gradual 1y be
transferred to that executive when they requested it.
After considerable debate and conflict on the Executive Commi ttee
over whether to start a general or industrial union, it was
finally decided to start organising workers in the metal
industry. After six months of organisational efforts a Branch
Executive Committee CBEC) of the Transvaal branch of the Metal
and Allied Workers' Union (MAWU) was finally established in
September 1975.
The transfer of power to the union's BEC did however not take
place as smoothly as was initially envisaged. Instead, a
power struggle developed between intellectuals in MAWU on the one
si de and the IAS on the other for control over the union and its
policy. However a compromise was reached by the formation of a
new over-arch ing organisation with representation on it from both
the IAS and MAWU. The new bridging organisation, the Council of
Workers of the Witwatersrand (CIWW), was established in September
1976 with major i ty representat i on of the un i on on both the
Council and its executive arm, the Secretariat. CIWW took over
most of the functions previously performed by the IAS. These
included fund raising, administration and education.
The formation of CIWW was both a step backward and a step forward
in the democrat i sat i on process to which the intellectuals and
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other founders of the IAS was committed. It was a step
backward in that CIUIW constituted a structure that was
superimposed onto MAUIU and the IAS. In particular the
Secretariat tended to operate as the executive of the union
thereby stifling the development of the union's BEC. On the
other hand the formation of CIWW was a step forward in that it
was a semi-representative body which took over the key functions
previously performed by the unrepresentative IAS. :
The democratisation of the structures was considerably advanced
in July 1978 when CIWW reconstituted itself as the Transvaal
region of the Trade Union Advisory and Co-ordinating Council
(TUACC). The representation of IAS on the TUACC Council was
reduced to a minimal two members whereas the full BEC of MAWU was
represented on the Council. The establishment of the Transport
and General Workers' Union late in 1978 added yet further weight
to worker representatives on the Council and Secretariat.
The principles existent in TUACC were embodied in the structures
of FUSATU which was founded in April 1979. Majorities of worker
representatives were constitutionally ensured on bodies at all
hierarchical levels with only one exception, the Executive
Committee. Even so the first Executive Committee did have a 4-3
major i ty of worker representat ives.
Hrom the time of its inception, it thus took the IAS almost five
years to transform itself and the relationship between the
organisations it was instrumental in creating into democratic
structures.
Urban Training Project
The UTP was founded in Johannesburg in 1971 by former TUCSA trade
un i on ist wi th two Wh i tes as the dr i v i ng force i n the
organisation. The UTP soon assisted in reviving African unions
and founding new ones at the request of the workers they were
training. The UTP experienced none of the agonising problems
the Advice Bureau and IAS went through in establishing trade
unions with democratic structures. This was probably due to the
fact that the UTP founders were experienced trade unionists.
Within the first two years of its existence the UTP had already
revived two African unions and helped establish two new unions.
It was also providing educational and other services for the
long-established Engineering and Allied Workers' Union <EAWU>.
It successfully continued its activities and by the end of 1975
it had helped to establish seven new African unions, revived two,
and was providing a wide range of services to all of them. The
serv i ces were basi c infrastructural ones and included fund
raising, emp1oyi ng un i on organisers, educat i on as we 11 as
admininstrative and accounting assistance. It also rented
office space for many of the unions.
There was however no attempt on the side of the UTP to transform
itself into an organisation that was structurally accountable to
the unions it was servicing. It carried on as a relatively
autonomous organ isation with control and direction in the hands
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the time of the u n i o n s ' inception.
Probably the most important training received by w o r k e r s w a s
experiential as they engaged in their s t r u g g l e s to collectively
defend and advance their rights at the w o r k p l a c e . In addition
to that all the o r g a n i s a t i o n s also undertook formal and informal
training of w o r k e r s . Although all the o r g a n i s a t i o n s commenced
by pIac i ng great emphasi s on worker training and education, their
e x p e r i e n c e s diverged w i d e l y as time went on.
The Advice Bureau initially laid s t r e s s on the political and
ideological education of w o r k e r s although it also taught w o r k e r s
their rights under industrial laws and how to set about forming
registered w o r k s c o m m i t t e e s . But much of the training w a s
inappropriate in that it w a s too remote from the w o r k e r s '
e x p e r i e n c e s and w o r k p l a c e c o n c e r n s . The organisational d e m a n d s
on intellectuals w o r k e d to the detr iment of formal training as
less and less time and r e s o u r c e s w e r e a l l o c a t e d to it. Separate
training sessions were eventually no longer held so that by 1980
the GWU had completely abandoned formal t r a i n i n g .
In the IAS formal training w a s also initially inappropriate for
similar r e a s o n s . It also became less p r o m i n e n t , but it never
dwindled away completely as a c o n t i n u i t y w a s m a i n t a i n e d by a
university lecturer w h o did not become embroiled in w o r k e r
o r g a n i s a t i o n . Up to 1979 education therefore continued at a low
level for the union B E C s and advanced shop s t e w a r d s . It a I so
became more closely linked with organisational issues. Formal
training w a s therefore sustained at a low level for the m o r e
advanced worker r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s b e c a u s e the u n i o n s could draw on
outsi de r e s o u r c e s .
E x p e r i e n c e s with formal education in the UTP took a very
different path. From the outset their c o u r s e s were practically
linked with the w o r k e r s ' situation and organisational n e e d s .
Since the UTP retained its relative a u t o n o m y and set store by its
educational service to the u n i o n s , formal training w a s continued
throughout the period. By contrast to the other o r g a n i s a t i o n s ,
the UTP w a s able to sustain w o r k e r e d u c a t i o n by a l l o c a t i n g
sufficient r e s o u r c e s to it and not being subject to the same
p r e s s u r e s from organisational d e m a n d s as the u n i o n s w e r e .
The w o r k e r s ' capacity to take d e m o c r a t i c control of their
o r g a n i s a t i o n s w a s however not p r i m a r i l y d e t e r m i n e d by the extent
of their formal training. Experiential and informal training a s
well as the p o l i c i e s and organisational p r a c t i c e s instilled in
the w o r k e r s were also key d e t e r m i n a n t s in the democratisation
p r o c e s s . The p r o g r e s s made by u n i o n s d u r i n g the period under
consideration will be considered n e x t .
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3.2 Evaluation o-f Democrat i sat i on Process
General Workers' Union
The democratisation process in the GWU up to the end of 1980 was
quite advanced in workplace organisation. The union's
recognition policy was that workers' committees had to negotiate
with management by themselves without union officials present.
In practice this policy was by and large adhered to by the union
off i c i als. The worker representatives received consi derable
informal and experiential training in workplace democracy by
instituting regular general worker meetings of the company.
From about 1978 the Controlling Committee of the GUIU was not
afraid to criticise the union officials and try to hold them
accountable. It only met once a month however which made it
impossible for the Commi ttee to exercise effective control over
the officials. (56) Thus leadership of the union had
effectively remained in the hands of the officials thereby still
mak i ng it an ol igarch i c organ i sat i on.
We found that the problem is a difficulty finding a
balance between democracy and leadership. In enforcing
this democracy the real leadership in fact remains in
the hands of the staff because one doesn't have the
workers wi th enough ongoi ng knowledge on the day to day
activities in order to really take over Ieadersh i p.
<57)
This problem was more or less resolved in 1988 when it was
decided that the Controlling Committee would elect an Executive
Commi ttee of seven members who wouId meet weekly with union
officials. The Executive Committee had administrative powers
and controlled union finances, but could not take decisions on
union policy. However the Controlling Committee was still
heavily reliant on the information and advice provided by the
White intellectuals in certain key areas such as evaluating what
the consequences wouId be for the union jf it were to register.
Up to the end of 1986 the intellectuals were also responsible for
overseeing the general administration and co-ordination of the
union's affairs. This was most clearly demonstrated in the meat
strike of 1988. The detention of four White intellectuals and a
Black organiser during the strike seriously hampered the
efficient functioning of the union.
Thus towards the end of 1980 democratic practices had gained a
considerable foothold in the GWU although White intellectuals
were still influential and played an important co-ordinating role
i n the un i on.
FOSATU (Transvaal)
Within FOSATU in the Transvaal region there was a differential
development of democracy in the unions that was closely related
to their origins. The unions that grew up in the TUACC
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tradition, in particular MAWU, had the most advanced workplace
democracy and leadersh ip accountabi1 i ty bu i1t into them with the
unions formerly serviced by the UTP displaying least shop-floor
democracy.
In MAWU a strong emphasis was placed on the role o-f shop stewards
and their committees. The union's BEC members who were shop
steward representatives -from each o-f the organised -factories,
were involved in decisi on-mak ing on general un i on i ssues and
commenced taking strong stands on them by 1978. Worker leaders
who wielded influence within and beyond the union, started
emerging from the ranks of the union. BEC members did however
not raise general union i ssues at shop stewards commi ttees'
meetings with the results that they did not bring the shop
stewards' views on these issues to the BEC.
At the regional level FOSATU in Transvaal faced a number of
formidable challenges in democratising the structures that were
created by its formation. The overnight expansion from two
unions in TUACC to eight unions in FOSATU inevitably led to a
burgeoning of bureaucracy in the organisation. As a result
FOSATU in Transvaal was faced with the fundamental problem that
it had created structures in advance of workers' capacities to
take control of them. Consequently extra-constitutional staff
committees emerged in a number of localities to cope with the
organisational demands. They played an important role in co-
ordination and administration, but in so doing they removed
control of the organisation out of the hands of the workers and
their representatives. The formation of FOSATU therefore led to
a renewed strengthening of the oligarchic tendency at the
regional level in the Transvaal.
Intellectuals still remained influential in KOSATU, but their
power had been curtailed by the growth of trade unions with
accountable structures and practices. Although the initiative for
policies still came from intellectuals, they could only put the
policies forward provided they had- support from their
constituents. According to the Regional Secretary of Transvaal,
policy initiatives in FOSATU towards the end of 197? came from
five to six officials in the movement. Of the six only two
were White officials, the other were two Coloured and two African
secretaries of significant unions in Transvaal and the rest of
the country.
The formation of FOSATU had thus reinforced an oligarchic
tendency in the organisation in Transvaal at the regional level.
Within some of the un i ons the process of democrat i sat i on had
however been wel1 establ i shed wi th consi derable effort be i ng
placed on practising shopfloor democracy. There was thus also a
countervailing democratic tendency at worK in the organisation.
UTP and the Consultative Committee of Black Trade Unions
In the Consultative Committee unions workplace organisation
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was unevenly developed: it was qu i te advanced i n some of the
unions while it was virtually non-existent in one o-f them. The
Food Beverage Workers' Union appeared to have the most extensive
shop-floor organisation. The unions did not pi ace a very strong
emphasis on shop-floor organisation although their shop stewards
in some unions took up grievances with management where possible
and works committees of the unions did negotiate with management.
The form of democracy that the Consultative unions strove after
was where the Executive Committee of a union was accountable to
the members of the union in general. When the unions serviced
by the UTP were established in the early 1970s, the secretaries
were in control of the unions. The first stage in the
democratisation of the Consultative unions was reached more or
less between 1977 and 1978 when the Executive members of the
unions became aware of the powers vested in them by the unions'
constitutions and as direct representatives of the workers. in
the majority of Consultative unions the secretaries adjusted
harmoniously to such sharing of control with the Executive
Committees as did take place. In three of the unions however
power struggles evolved as members of the Executive tried to
wrest a share in the control of the unions from the secretaries.
Thus by 1979 the ConsuItative unions had more or 1 ess passed
through a first stage of democratisation with the Executive
Commi ttees acquiring power within the unions. The un i ons were
however still predomi nant1y ol i garch i c in character because the
union officials and Executive Committees were still not
effectively accountable to workers in the factories. In the
first pi ace the election of an Executive Commi ttee by an Annual
General Meet ing did not ensure that each organ i sed factory was
represented on the Executive. Secondly, the relatively low
emphasis given to shopfloor organisation meant that there was
a considerable gap between the activities of the Executive
Committees of the unions and what the rank and file knew about
these activities. Given the lack of knowledge by the rank and
file members of the ongoing decisions being taken by the
Executive and officials, they were not in a position to hold the
h i erarchy accountable.
The Consultative Committee unions had thus successfully gone
through one stage in their democratisation by the elected
Executive Committees asserting their right to exercise power in
the unions on behalf of the members. Th i s stage was however
still oligarchic in that the rank and file members had no
effective control over the Executive Committee.
Summary and Conclusion:
Democratisation Process in Independent Unions
The independent unions considered in this paper all owed their
or i gi ns to ol i garch ic o r g a n i s a t i o n s in that they were con trolled
by their f o u n d e r s , w h o were m a i n l y White i n t e l l e c t u a l s , and wer e
not elected b y , nor accountable t o , the African w o r k e r s they w e r e
e n d e a v o u r i n g to o r g a n i s e . T h i s w a s un&voi dabl e in the
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circumstances that prevailed at the time with the African working
class virtually completely unmobilised. The intellectuals were
however commi tted to creating democrat i c organ i sat i ons and
consequently set in motion a democratisation process.
The democratisation process had two phases that commenced at the
same time. The first phase was the creation of democratic
structures. This phase was more or less successfully carried
out by all the groups at least in as far as the basic structure
of the unions was concerned. The second phase in the
democratisation process was the development of the capacity of
workers in the unions to take control of the democrat i c
structures. For democracy to exist in practice it was necessary
for the workers to be able to force democratic practices into all
the structures of the organ i sat i on. The un i ons under
consideration had all succeeded in enabling some worker control
at the executive level of the unions. This was however not
sufficient to ensure that democracy existed throughout all the
organisations. Oligarhic tendencies were thus still present in
one form or other in al1 of them.
in all the unions and groups the workers had therefore not
yet acquired the capacities necessary to seize democrat i c control
of their organ i sat i ons. There was however a distinct i ncrease i n
their capacities over the period.
Contrary to Michels, the empirical findings do not portray an
iron law of oligarchy operating in the independent trade unions,
instead of democratic organisations inevitably becoming
oligarchic as Michels would predict, there was a contrary trend
of ol i garch i c organ i sat i ons becomi ng more democrat i c. The force
behind the democratisation of the unions was the commitment of
the intellectuals and other leaders to democracy rather than
workers impelling democratic practices into the unions.
But nor was there an iron law of democracy at work in the
independent unions. The tendencies- towards democracy and
oligarchy both remained present and circumstances determined
which of these tendencies were dominant at any particular time.
It was also found that democratic tendencies could be on the
increase in one part of an organisation while oligarchy would be
strengthened elsewhere at the same time.
Whereas in Britain the driving force behind the democratisation
of the unions after the 1960s was the upsurge in worker action on
the shopfloor, workers in the independent unions did not play a
comparable role in South Africa in the 1978s. The difference
was probably due to the very disadvantaged nature of the African
working class in South Africa, particularly as far as formal
school education was concerned. That was why the promotion of
workers' capacities to seize hold of their own organisations was
one of the crucial tasks that faced intellectuals and other
leaders in the independent unions in the 1978s.
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